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This is a pre-copy-editing version of a chapter from Mike Higton and Jim 
Fodor, eds, Routledge Companion to the Practice of Christian Theology 






Every word that you speak or write as a theologian will be a product of 
human reason. What else could it be? As soon as you have put a moment’s 
thought into what you say, or as soon as you accept that what you say might 
be open to any kind of correction, you have already become involved in 
reasoning. It makes no more sense to ask whether your words are too much 
or too little the product of reason than it does to ask whether the words I am 
writing now are too much or too little the product of my typing. What 
matters is not the quantity, but the quality and kind of reasoning involved. 
 
The fact that ‘reason’ is the first of this book’s four main sections does not 
imply that we think reason is somehow more authoritative than scripture, or 
tradition, or experience. As we have explained in the introduction, we don’t 
find it particularly helpful to think of theology as an attempt to balance the 
claims derived from four different sources, and to get the priority among 
those four sources right. To say that theology is reasoning all the way 
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through is not yet to say anything – whether positive or negative – about 
theology’s relation to the Bible, or to tradition, or to experience. Different 
qualities and kinds of reasoning will relate to Bible, tradition, and 
experience in very different ways. 
 
But what is reasoning? In order to provide an initial answer to that question, 
I am going to begin with an analogy. Reasoning is, I claim, like the building 
of a child’s wooden railway. I’m thinking of the kind of railway that comes 
as a set of wooden track sections – straights, curves, junctions, bridges – 
ready to be fitted together into networks. My family is, I think, typical in 
having a rather random collection of pieces, some inherited, some bought. 
The attempt to make a coherent layout from them all (such that the train will 
be able to navigate the whole network without having to be lifted from the 
tracks), still more to make a complete layout (one that uses all the pieces 
and leaving no loose ends), is no easy business. You get a certain way 
through, and then realize that you do not have enough curves left to join the 
two remaining ends – so you take a curve out here and a straight there in 
order to free up an extra piece, only to find that now you have a spare 
junction, and nowhere to put it. Working towards a coherent and complete 
layout – if that is indeed what you want – is a complex process. You can’t 
simply start at the beginning, add the pieces one by one, and carry on all the 
way to the end. You have to experiment with a possibility, then unpick it a 
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little and rebuild slightly differently, so as to respond to what that 
experiment has shown you. 
 
It is a matter of ongoing, iterative, unpredictable negotiation. ‘Ongoing’, 
because you try experiment after experiment, and it all takes time; 
‘iterative’, because each experiment responds to the problems exposed by 
the last experiment, and you try again and again to make the layout work; 
‘unpredictable’, because nothing can tell you in advance how thoroughgoing 
the reworking of your existing layout will need to be as you face any 
particular inconsistency; ‘negotiation’ because every change you make 
involves seeking some agreement between the connection you want to make 
and the tolerances of the connections already made. 
 
Of course, when one has, with triumph, produced a workable network, all 
pieces in place (and without too much strain on any of the joints), it 
inevitably happens that some small child (probably in revenge for the adult 
takeover of his or her playthings) will discover an extra piece of track from 
behind the sofa. And the finding of that extra piece will start the whole 
iterative process going again. 
 
We can use the noun ‘settlement’ to refer a coherent track layout: a 
workable arrangement in which all the presently available pieces have been 
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placed together, to the present satisfaction of the builders. However, we can 
also use the verb ‘to settle’ to denote the activity of seeking a settlement: the 
active process of iterative renegotiation and repair by which broken 
networks are remade in pursuit of settlement. And though the application to 
theology may not yet be clear, my claim is that ‘reasoning’ is, at its most 
basic, simply the faculty of settling: the faculty by which one thinkingly 
pursues ongoing, iterative, unpredictable negotiation with the materials 
given to one, in search of a settlement. It involves serious playfulness (the 
willingness to experiment, to unpick and remake again and again); it 
involves a quick imagination (the ability to see possible reworkings of the 
materials one has to hand); and it involves various kinds of practical 
knowhow (familiarity with how tight a curve one can persuade the pieces to 
yield, or with the ways in which an articulated bridge can be put together). It 
is a skill, or set of skills: one can practice it, learn, and get better at it – 
though however skilled one becomes, the game never loses its iterative, 
negotiable character. 
 
When you hear the word ‘reason’, therefore, try not to think too quickly of 
an argument written down in clear steps on a page. That is not reasoning but 
the record of some reasoning, like the diagram of a completed train track. 
Think instead of an activity, of people seeking a settlement: an ongoing, 
iterative, unpredictable negotiation. 
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REASONING IN THEOLOGY 
 
Theology involves reasoning – or, better, theology is a practice of reasoning 
– in precisely this sense. It is an ongoing, iterative, unpredictable, 
negotiation. Think, for instance, of an individual theology student. She 
brings with her some set of inherited ideas (a settlement of some kind), and 
finds herself faced with all sorts of new ideas from her teachers, her fellow 
students, and from the books and articles she reads. (She’s presented with 
the extra track piece, from behind the sofa – or has someone take away the 
piece that currently joins her bridge to her turntable.) Her existing 
settlement involves certain ways of using the Bible, which imply certain 
claims about what it is and how it should be read. It involves some claims 
about earlier generations of Christian settlers, and what notice deserves to 
be taken of their attempts at settlement. It involves claims about the nature 
of the world she inhabits, and about the proper ways of living in it. But the 
new claims that she encounters unsettle her settlement: they call it into 
question, or present her with ideas that she does not know how to assimilate. 
She becomes engaged in active settling, in reasoning, to the extent that she 
tries to make sense of these new ideas – trying to see how they might fit in 
to her settlement, trying to see what alteration to that settlement might be 
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necessary, trying to do justice to what she believes ought to remain central 
to that settlement, trying to decide what might need to be rejected. 
 
The process of settling might be set off by something relatively trivial. 
Perhaps she hears one of her lecturers confidently arguing that the book of 
Isaiah is not a unified whole, but includes material by Proto-, Deutero- and 
Trito-Isaiah. As well as assessing the cogency of the lecturer’s arguments, 
she finds herself wondering whether and how such a conclusion affects 
other things she has been taught as she grew up. Does it call into question 
things she’s been taught about the reliability and integrity of biblical 
authors, or the nature of prophecy? Can she adjust this track piece without 
having to rearrange the whole layout? It is unlikely that she’ll find answers 
to these questions immediately, or that she’ll know quickly what ripples of 
change might spread out around her settlement from this point. Making 
sense of this claim will involve an ongoing, iterative, unpredictable 
negotiation. 
 
This example risks missing something important, however – something that 
has been visible when I have, on occasion, made the train track analogy very 
practically in class. I have sometimes brought in a bag of track pieces, 
tipped them onto a table, and asked a group of students to make a coherent 
and complete layout. It is fascinating to watch. Various members of the 
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group propose possible settlements. They argue. Often, a loud and plausible 
voice manages to dominate early on, until the settlement that he was 
working towards fails, and other participants take over. The activity 
becomes a mixture of co-operation, consultation, disagreement and 
negotiation. The settlement-making faculty here is not a matter of isolated 
individual contemplation, but is a social activity. Individual imagination is 
certainly involved, but only as an ingredient in a complex social pattern of 
give and take – of ideas offered, tried, rejected, and improved upon. It is an 
activity in which specific people engage, and their personalities and habits 
of interaction with those around them change the activity’s character and 
outcome. 
 
It might be better, therefore, to think not so much of an individual thinker, 
but of a Christian community engaged in active settlement: a community 
with some existing habits of practice and belief, some existing patterns of 
commitments, some remembered history; a community working out how to 
order its life in its present context, how to relate to new challenges and 
questions. Imagine, for instance, a Christian congregation faced for the first 
time with a member who has an intersex condition – someone who is 
biologically not straightforwardly classifiable as male or female. If the life 
of this congregation is in part ordered by practices that assign clearly-
defined and different roles to men and women, the presence of someone 
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who can't easily be assigned to either group may possibly set off a chain 
reaction of rethinking and reordering that could end up reshaping the whole 
life of the community. The community will be engaged in active settling to 
the extent that it tries to make sense of its life in the light of this new 
challenge that it faces, and in the light of all that it is committed to and all 
that it has inherited. And that settling is likely to be a social process, a 
complex mess of co-operation, argument, negotiation, politics.1 
 
THE CHARACTER OF THEOLOGICAL REASONING 
 
The skills involved in being a theological reasoner are analogous to those 
involved in being a good builder of railway layouts. Reasoning involves a 
practiced familiarity with the materials that need to be taken into account 
while settling. It involves knowing well how those materials can and do 
connect. It involves a sense for how much ‘give’ there might be in any 
specific connection. What tremors through a whole settlement are going to 
be set off by a change here? Which connections will that change break, and 
which can bend to accommodate it? What, therefore, is really at stake in that 
change? To be a good theological reasoner is to be someone adept at tracing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 On this topic, see S. Cornwall, Sex and Uncertainty in the Body of Christ: 
Intersex Conditions and Christian Theology, London / Oakeville, CT: 
Equinox, 2010. 
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the connections, and so at seeing the constraints and the possibilities faced 
by those seeking settlement. 
 
To put it another way, theological reasoning involves a Christian 
community taking responsibility for the exposure to challenge of all that it 
says, does and thinks. The German theologian Karl Barth, at the very 
beginning of his massive Church Dogmatics, says that theology arises when 
the church ‘realizes that it must give an account to God for the way in which 
it speaks’2 and ‘takes up … the task of criticising and revising its speech 
about God.’3 To say that all theology is reasoning through and through is to 
say that all theology is engaged in this taking of responsibility, this 
criticising and revising. To say that what matters is not the quantity but the 
quality and kind of reasoning is to say that what matters is how that task of 
critique and revision is carried out. On what basis is the speech and action 
of the church properly criticized and revised – and how does that criticism 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 He includes in the church’s ‘speaking’ its ‘specific action as a fellowship, 
. . . proclamation by preaching and the administration of the sacraments, . . . 
worship, . . . internal and external mission including works of love amongst 
the sick, the weak and those in jeopardy.’ K. Barth, Church Dogmatics I/1, 
trans. G.W. Bromiley and T.F. Torrance, Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1975, p. 3. 
3 Ibid. 
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and revision then proceed? What kind of exposure to challenge does the 
church face? 
 
A Christian community might, for instance, claim to be obedient to 
Scripture in certain ways. If people in that community come to realize that, 
in what it says, does and thinks, it is implicitly claiming that Scripture says 
x, they discover a very specific way in which their community is exposed to 
challenge. It is exposed to the possibility that more assiduous reading of 
Scripture will show that it does not, in fact, quite say x. 
 
I don’t at this stage want to discuss the precise forms of exposure that drive 
theological reasoning. Different Christian communities will understand their 
exposure to challenge in other ways – and the whole of the rest of this book 
could be thought of as an attempt to trace some of the forms of exposure 
that are central to Christian theology, and to trace the practices of ‘criticism 
and revision’ that respond to them. I am more interested at this point in the 
form that all such taking of responsibility shares. 
 
If theological reasoning involves a Christian community taking 
responsibility for the exposure to challenge of all that it does, says, and 
thinks, for instance, then it must also involve taking responsibility for 
discovering how all those things interconnect. The explicit, clearly stated 
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exposure to challenge of the community’s action, speech and thought may 
be rather limited – but it may turn out, on more careful investigation, that 
there are deeper connections, increasing the ways in which any given aspect 
of the church’s life is exposed. A church decides not to buy fair-trade coffee 
for its refreshments after services, for instance, because the catering 
committee felt the taste was not good enough – but it turns out that this 
issue is not only connected to the church’s vision of how to provide a warm 
and hospitable welcome, but also connected to questions about justice and 
financial responsibility. Or it turns out that the church’s habits in regard to 
the proper length of sermons are related to deep patterns of thinking about 
the convicting work of the Spirit in bringing people to repentance. Or it 
turns out that the church’s policy on the ministry of women is related to 
deep questions about the shape of its operative Christology. Each of these 
connections increase the ways in which the action, speech and thought of 
this community is exposed to question. To take responsibility for exploring 
such exposure is to take responsibility for exploring these connections. 
 
Such theological reasoning is not, however, simply about exposure, 
challenge, and criticism. It is also about what Barth calls ‘revision’: the 
imagination and proposal of ways forward, new forms of action, speech and 
thought – new ways of settling the pieces that this community has been 
given, including the new demands that it faces. This means that theological 
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reasoning involves not simply a commitment to tracing commitments and 
exposures that already exist, but a work of constructive imagination. It 
involves glimpsing a way that things might be able to hang together 
differently, and making a proposal for how the layout of all this 
community’s pieces might be remade, in some way that this community can 
acknowledge to be good. 
 
In other words, theological reasoning involves both unsettling (tracing the 
community’s exposure to question, and seeing where those questions lead), 
and settling (imagining new layouts, and seeing to what extent they are 
possible). 
 
The process of unsettling can be very unsettling indeed. I said earlier that 
‘nothing can tell you in advance how deep the reworking of your existing 
layout will need to be as you face any particular inconsistency’ – and 
acknowledging that your current way of putting things is exposed to a 
question that it cannot immediately answer can trigger anything from a 
minor correction to a wholesale rethinking. Think of both the examples I 
gave earlier – of a theology student trying to discover how to settle with a 
claim about the authorship of Isaiah, or a Christian community trying to 
understand how to relate to someone with an intersex condition. In each 
case, one can imagine that the challenge might trigger a whole chain 
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reaction of rethinking and altered practice – a whole process of unsettling 
and resettling – at least if the student or some members of the community 
are taking seriously the nature of the connections that hold their current 
settlement together, and are willing to follow the implications of this 
challenge along those various connections. And in each case, this process 
might lead to a new settlement emerging: to the development of a new way 
of imagining how things hang together, and what their connections and 
exposures can be. 
 
WRITING AS REASONING 
 
Something of this settling-and-unsettling nature of theological reasoning can 
be seen in a very practical way when one writes an essay or a paper. For 
most of us, the difference between an adequate and a great essay is made at 
the revision stage. Before that, you might have managed to get quite a lot of 
relevant material down on paper, and given a plausible shape to it; it might 
make a more-or-less connected whole. In other words, you have something 
like a settlement – an arrangement of material that is meant to be more-or-
less complete (that is, it includes all the relevant pieces – or, at least, as 
many of those pieces as is reasonable in an essay of this length and level), 
and an arrangement that is meant to have some coherence to it (that is, so to 
arrange the pieces that each is connected into a structure that includes all of 
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them). But then you look at what you have written, and ask how cogent all 
the connections are that hold this layout together – whether this bit really 
goes with that bit, whether this claim really flows from that claim, whether 
here you have tried to slide past an idea that you didn’t really get, or 
whether there you have simply asserted something that really ought to have 
been argued for, whether you have simply stacked on claim upon another 
without showing effectively how they do in fact link up with one another. 
 
At first, the whole thing might be rather muddy – to the extent that it is hard 
to say exactly what is wrong with it, except that it is not very clear and well 
ordered. But as one revises and polishes, giving as much clarity and 
precision as one can to what one has written, it can become easier to see 
what the real problems are – the real inconsistencies or breaks in the 
argument. And, as with the train track, it is not always possible to know in 
advance how fundamental a revision will be called for by any particular 
problem that one identifies. 
 
Eventually, one may end up with an essay that is a clear, coherent, orderly 
argument or presentation – something with an introduction and a 
conclusion, and a body of writing between the two that actually leads from 
the former to the latter. One might be tempted to say that the finished 
presentation is an example of theological reasoning – but actually it is the 
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process of composition and revision (and revision and revision and revision) 
in pursuit of such a finished presentation that is the real example of 
theological reasoning. The finished presentation is simply the trace or 
product of that reasoning – and hopefully a prompt for theological reasoning 
by others. 
 
Of course, a finished presentation is unlikely to be ‘finished’ in the sense 
that everything is settled, all questions answered, and no further lines of 
enquiry have been exposed. There will almost certainly be questions left 
open, ideas you have not been able to get clear, material you are aware 
could have been worked in better to the overall structure. There will, in 
other words, be a residue of unsettled material (and it is normally best to 
acknowledge this, and to be as clear about it as you can, rather than trying to 
pull the wool over your own or your readers’ eyes). There is always going 
to be such unsettled material outstanding in any large-scale attempt at 
settlement; nobody ever finishes settling. And yet that unsettled material 
retains its power to unsettle. It has the potential to drive further work, 
further thinking, the unpicking and re-stitching of one’s settlement – and 
who knows the size of the transformation that these unsettled questions have 
the power to trigger? 
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The writing of an essay or paper like this is not a bad model for theological 
reasoning more generally. Reason involves what one might think of as an 
ascetic journey, or a spiritual discipline. On the one hand, it involves 
stepping out in faith, trusting that you have something to say – or that if you 
do not, you will be able to discover, by means of diligent attentiveness, 
something to say. But it also involves the willingness to expose your ideas 
and claims to rigorous testing, and so to expose yourself to the possibility of 
discovering that you have been wrong. Theological reasoning can therefore 
be a painful process, in which things in which you have invested time and 
energy, things that are dear to you, have to be left behind. 
 
One might even say that theological reasoning is a kind of journey of 
discipleship, or something akin to it: a willingness to follow the implications 
of the gospel wherever they lead, to trace their connections into any and all 
areas of practice and thought, to allow them to unsettle and resettle your 
community’s and your own ways of making sense – and to allow your 
understanding of the Christian gospel itself to be deepened and transformed 
in the process. The diligence involved in making connections and testing 
them, the diligence involved in seeking clarity and good order, even the 
diligence involved in revising an essay over and over again – at their best, 
these forms of diligence are simply ways of seeking greater accountability 
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(for the church and for oneself) in what you do, say and think in response to 




As in my example above of the student learning about Isaiah, the word 
‘reason’ can conjure up a picture of something done in solitude – by the 
student with her books, sitting in a secluded corner of a library, perhaps. 
That might lead one to think that becoming a theologian is a matter of 
becoming an individual expert: one who has wrestled his or her settlement 
into order by dint of heroic intellectual struggles in private, and is now 
ready to pronounce his or her findings to a wider public. In some theologies 
– some theological settlements – that might be exactly the vision of the 
theologian that is promoted, but we should certainly not take that for 
granted. In different theological settlements, the nature of the practice of 
reasoning itself will be seen in different ways. 
 
In some, the reasoning activity that is most central to theology will be a 
matter of the shared deliberations of a local Christian community, seeking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 I elaborate this point a little in Vulnerable Learning: Toward a Theology 
of Higher Education, Cambridge: Grove, 2005, and a lot in A Theology of 
Higher Education, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012. 
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discernment for the ordering of their life in a changing world; in others, it 
will be centred on debates between church leaders gathered in councils, 
setting the boundaries within which they believe the life of their church will 
flourish most faithfully; in others, it might take place most obviously in the 
seminars, conferences, journals and books of an academic discipline, in 
which a restless intellectual conversation is carried on. 
 
In other words, to know what it means for theology to be a form of reason 
involves asking questions about who reasons, and about those for whom 
they reason; and it involves questions about the relationships between the 
deliberations of individual believers, local communities, church leaders, and 
academic disciplines. 
 
As will have been clear already, I’ve assumed in this chapter that 
theological reasoning is first of all the corporate deliberation and argument 
of the church – without trying at this point to specify too closely the scale I 
have in mind when I say ‘church’, or where I take the boundaries of the 
church to be. (And yes, that does mean that what I have said is not ‘neutral’; 
it will work better for some theological settlements than for others.) The 
primary kind of settling I have in mind is the process by which the members 
of the church deliberate together about the right ordering of their life 
together: about how the church can be faithful to its calling in the situation 
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in which it finds itself; about how it can do justice to the gospel, to the 
various responsibilities given to it, to what it has inherited, and to the 
challenges it now faces. It is the process by which the members of the 
church seek to know how to go on together as a Christian church. 
 
If that corporate settling has priority, then the individual theologian’s 
activity of settling – the process by which he or she tries to make sense for 
herself of all that she has learnt – is secondary. It is not unimportant, but it 
matters primarily insofar as it affects, or serves, or participates in the 
broader, more corporate process of settling of the church. The individual 
Christian theologian who makes some claim about the sense that can be 
made of things is not thereby finishing the theological task, but is setting it 
going: she is making a proposal for how the church and its members should 
order their life together in the world, and launching that proposal into the 
life of the church to see what becomes of it.5 As such, her work is inherently 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 This means, incidentally, that the question of whether the individual 
theologian thinks of himself or herself as a Christian believer is not the most 
important question to ask. What does matter is the ability of the individual 
theologian to make proposals about the life of the church that make sense to 
the members of that church – proposals that do justice to the deep 
commitments and habits of thought and action of that church. That certainly 
requires empathetic and imaginative understanding of the life of the church, 
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experimental: she does not deliver an authoritative ruling that others are 
required to obey, but makes a claim that others will test. 
 
One of the problems sometimes faced by academic theology – especially 
theology studied in a university setting – is that there is little practical 
connection between the reasoning activity that takes place in the classroom 
or library and the reasoning activity of the church. Worries about theology 
being too much a matter of human reason sometimes come down to this: the 
worry that the processes of theological settlement have lost their moorings 
in the Christian community, and have become a free-floating activity with 
no real routes by which they can make a difference to the ordering of the 
church’s life. It can be the worry that the motor that drives theological 
development has ceased to be the attempt to do justice to all the demands 
and commitments that shape the church’s life, and has instead become the 
desire for intellectual resolution amongst academics. By losing the 
wherewithal to take serious responsibility for the church’s life, academic 
theology has become irresponsible. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and to do it well will almost certainly involve some kind of immersion in 
the life of the church – but it is not hard to imagine someone committing to 
pursuit of that kind of understanding, and to making a contribution thereby 
to the life of the church, whilst still considering themselves an observer 
rather than a member. 
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If becoming a good theological reasoner involves a practiced familiarity 
with the materials for settlement, and with the actual and potential 
connections between them, it also involves an awareness of the connection 
between the individual theological reasoner and the community or 
communities with whom and for whom he or she reasons. It involves 
understanding how these communities take responsibility for the exposure, 
connection, and development of their own lives, and of the place that the 
individual theologian can play in that process. To understand theological 
reasoning means understanding the shape of the community in and for 
which it takes place. 
 
WHO IS LISTENING? 
 
The question about the community or communities for whom the 
theological reasoner reasons – about the audience to whom she offers 
reasons – is actually a deeply controversial one. By some accounts, it is the 
controversy that has shaped modern theology – and one influential way of 
mapping the bewildering variety of forms of theology over the past two 
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hundred years or so is to look at how different theologies answer that 
question.6 
 
What I have written in this chapter so far has taken Christian theology to be 
a practice of reasoning by which the church seeks to understand better how 
to order its own life and how to live its life in the wider world. I have, 
therefore, presented theological reasoning as a form of reasoning addressed 
primarily to the church. It might, however, also be understood as a practice 
of reasoning by which the church seeks to understand how to address the 
wider world.7 A good deal of modern Western theology can be categorized 
according to whether it offers its reasons primarily to the church, or 
primarily to the wider world. So, there are theologies that address their 
reasons solely to members of the Christian community insofar – and to them 
only insofar as they are already faithful members of that community. For 
instance, in answer to the question, ‘Why do you believe in the bodily 
resurrection of Christ?’, the reason offered might ultimately be ‘Because the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 See H. Frei, Types of Christian Theology, ed. G. Hunsinger and W.C. 
Placher, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1992, and my discussion of it 
in Christ, Providence and History: Hans W. Frei’s Public Theology, 
London: Continuum, 2004, ch. 8. 
7 And that might include its own members, insofar as they are citizens of the 
world as well as members of the church. 
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Bible tells me so!’ or ‘Because the creeds tell me so!’ or by pointing in 
some other way to the commitments and sources that shape Christian life. 
There might still be robust, rigorous, detailed and extended argument about 
what Christians should do, say and think – argument that cites and examines 
evidence, and that is capable of changing minds – but it will be argument 
that takes certain basic sources or authorities for the church’s life for 
granted – and it will be argument that has weight for people only insofar as 
they adhere to those sources or authorities. 
 
On the other hand, there are theologies in which the reasoning is entirely 
and solely aimed at that strange abstract creature sometimes known as ‘any 
reasonable human being’, and in which there turns out to be no independent 
room for the specific claims, habits, sources and authorities of the Christian 
tradition (or indeed any other tradition). The Christian community’s claims 
will only count as true or proper to the extent that they are translations of 
claims that could equally well have been made without reference to 
Christian sources or authorities. 
 
It would be hard, in fact, to use the name ‘Christian theology’ for something 
that wholly met this description, because the Christian tradition would, 
strictly speaking, be entirely dispensable – except as a useful cover under 
which to convey philosophical content to a particular community. But one 
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would only need to move a little way away from this extreme to find a 
position that was much more recognisable as a form of Christian theology. 
There are, after all, plenty of theologies that try to begin with reasons 
addressed to ‘any reasonable human being’, and that are supposed to be 
convincing regardless of the particular community or tradition that the 
addressee might inhabit – but which claim that there are good generally 
accessible reasons to attend to specific Christian sources and authorities. So, 
in answer to the question, ‘Why do you believe in the bodily resurrection of 
Christ?’, a theologian focused on providing reasons for any reasonable 
human being might say ‘Because I have examined all the available 
historical evidence, using the standards of historical argument that I would 
expect any historian to use, Christian or secular, and I have concluded that 
this is the most probable interpretation of that evidence.’ Such an answer is 
intended to have weight with any listener who is willing to weigh the 
historical evidence fairly, and abide by widely accepted standards of 
historical reasoning. 
 
Most modern theology involves a more complex negotiation between 
reasons offered solely to the Christian community entirely on its own terms, 
and reasons offered to other constituencies. It is worth noting, though, that 
the tension between a ‘reasons for any reasonable human being’ kind of 
theology and a ‘community reasons only’ kind is not a tension between 
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‘rational’ and ‘irrational’ (nor between ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ or 
‘radical’ and ‘orthodox’). All these forms of theology can involve analysis 
and debate, the assiduous marshalling of evidence, the testing of one’s 
claims against the data that is relevant to them, and the possibility of having 
one’s mind changed by the force of the better argument. 
 
Nevertheless, the worry that theology is irrational, and the opposite worry 
that theology gives inappropriate sway to human reason, do sometimes rely 
upon the assumption that rationality really only means the offering of 
reasons to ‘any reasonable human being’ – and that the offering of reasons 
that are only telling for some specific community is not really reasoning at 
all. But that is an assumption that, in the broadest sense of the word, often 
has an implicit politics behind it. That is, it often rests upon a picture of 
society as consisting of a neutral public sphere (the realm of arguments open 
to ‘any reasonable human being’), within which there sit various private 
religious spheres (each the realm of arguments that make sense only to 
members of a specific tradition). The demand for reasons addressed to ‘any 
reasonable human being’ goes with the belief that properly public discourse 
can only be conducted in terms sterilized of commitment to particular 
communities or traditions, if peaceable order is to be given to a society with 
multiple such particular communities and traditions. Yet this picture of how 
secularity and religion relate is, to say the least, controversial – especially its 
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portrayal of the secular public sphere as itself neutral and traditionless, and 
its claim that it is possible to address people in the abstract as ‘any 
reasonable human beings’, rather than as members of this or that specific 
culture, formed by this or that specific history.8 
 
Worries about the rationality of theology – either the worry that there is too 
little of it, or that there is too much of it – are therefore tangled up with 
questions about how particular religious communities negotiate their place 
in a secular world. They are tangled up with questions about the supposed 
neutrality or openness of the public sphere, and with questions about the 
ability of religious participants in the public sphere to speak in their own 
voices in public. They are tangled up with questions about how peaceful 
order is maintained in religiously plural societies (and that’s why there is a 
chapter on ‘Theology and public reason’ later in this section: reason and 
politics are inseparable). For the purposes of this introductory chapter, 
however, the point to take away is much simpler. Theology is not written 
for no one in particular. If a theology offers reasons at all, it is worth asking 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Most famously, perhaps, these ideas were criticized by John Milbank, in 
Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, Oxford: Blackwell, 
1990, which begins: ‘Once there was no secular. And the secular was not 
latent, waiting to fill more space with the steam of the “purely human”, 
when the pressure of the sacred was relaxed’ (p. 9). 
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to whom they are offered – or to whom the author takes himself or herself to 
be offering those reasons. And even though many of the writing exercises 
that are set for students of theology are framed as if you were to write for 
nobody in particular, it is worth asking for whom you are in fact writing, 
and what difference the identification of the audience makes. For whom will 
your reasons be telling, and why? To whom are you responsible, in your 
reasoning? After all, theological reasoning does not live on pages in books 
hidden away in libraries: those are only the traces of theological arguments. 
Theological reasoning lives in the giving and receiving of reasons designed 
to sway or inform or challenge or encourage, and such giving and receiving 
always takes place, if it takes place at all, between people. 
 
WHAT PROMPTS REASONING? 
 
One of the definitions of ‘theology’ given by the Oxford English Dictionary 
is ‘a system of theoretical principles; an (impractical or rigid) ideology’. 
The worry that theology might be all too much a matter of ‘human reason’ 
sometimes comes down to this: that the theological reasoner is too intent 
upon finding an intellectual settlement (a coherent intellectual scheme in 
which there are no left over pieces), and too little upon finding a habitable 
settlement, in which a Christian community can live with integrity. The 
worry is either that the theologian will be too willing to do violence to the 
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commitments and constraints of the community’s life for the sake of his or 
her system, or that he or she will devote time and energy to questions that, 
from the point of view of habitability, reek of idle speculation. Here, ‘idle 
speculation’ would be a matter of providing answers to questions which 
only arise out of the desire to make the theologian’s intellectual system 
neater, but which make no difference to the life of the community that the 
theologian’s reasoning is supposedly serving. They are questions in which 
nothing is really at stake. 
 
Theological reasoning might perhaps be thought of instead as something 
like a matter of solving problems with the habitability of an existing 
settlement – and the primary form of coherence or neatness that it seeks is 
therefore that of renewed habitability. That is not to say that simple 
intellectual coherence is unimportant: for a settlement to be habitable for 
people who think, and who seek integrity and honesty in their speech, some 
kind of intellectual coherence is going to be important. But intellectual 
coherence in and for itself is not itself the goal. 
 
Theological reasoning might, even better, be thought of as responding to 
challenges that face a Christian community – as it encounters some form of 
suffering or of need or of outcry to which it does not yet know how to 
respond.  It is not the comfort of the reasoners that is in question – their 
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ability to rest easily in their settlement because it has no rough edges or 
awkward seams rubbing against their scheme – but their ability to respond, 
to be responsible.  Its goal is the development of new ways of living that 
answer to the cries of others. 
 
Part of what makes a good theological reasoner is, therefore, a practiced eye 
for what is really at stake in a given theological argument. What real 
problem in the life of Christian communities in the world prompted this 
argument? For whom is that problem real and pressing, and why? Who 
cares – and, if nobody cares, why should they care? If this question were to 
be left unanswered, or we were simply to admit our ignorance on the matter, 
what difference would it make? 
 
Of course, to insist upon such questions will not mean that one gets to avoid 
knotty metaphysical questions. The history of Christian theology is, in part, 
a history of people finding that the strangest things did matter: that there 
were real questions about Christian life in the world at stake in arguments 
about the relationship between the Father and the Son in the life of the 
Trinity, or about the proper shape of claims about Christ’s divinity or 
humanity, or in claims about the operations of grace on the human will, and 
so on. Nevertheless, there is no theological claim or conclusion so deeply 
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rooted in the life of the church that it is not in danger of being pulled free 
from that mooring and becoming a free-floating intellectual game. 
 
This warning should itself come with a warning, however. Theological 
reasoning can sometimes be a matter not of problem-solving, nor of idle 
speculation, but of delight.9 The boundary between delight and idle 
speculation is a very hazy one, and easy to slip across, but there is certainly 
a place for theology as a contemplative exploration of the richness and 
interconnection of the faith a community has inherited: such delight is, after 
all, one of the ways in which the theological reasoner deepens his 
familiarity with the materials available for settlement, and with the 
connections possible between them. Nevertheless, the ideas that the 
theological reasoner delights in exploring and connecting are ideas that have 
their place in the life of the church, and in the life of discipleship – and the 
theologian’s delighted exploration of those ideas is therefore at the same 
time an exploration of possible forms of Christian life in the world. Even in 
delight, theological reasoners should not lose track of what is at stake. 
Theological reasoning is above all an active pursuit of settlement, an 
ongoing, iterative, unpredictable social negotiation in pursuit of responsible 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Rowan Williams refers to this as the ‘celebratory’ mode of theology 
(rather than the ‘critical’ or ‘communicative’), in On Christian Theology, 
Oxford: Blackwell, 2000, p. xiv. 
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habitability – and the rest of this book is an attempt to delve deeper into the 





The chapters in this section explore various aspects of the practice of 
theological reason. 
 
Brad Kallenberg describes some of the different forms that theological 
reasoning has taken in the history of the church.  His chapter shows how far 
from the mark we would be if we imagined this history to be made up of 
individual thinkers developing ideas while sitting in their studies or libraries 
reading books.  The history of theological reasoning is not simply a drama 
of ideas: it is a drama of communities and practices, of experiments in 
corporate life, of conversations and interactions.   
 
Nicholas Adams’ chapter looks more closely at one aspect of this history of 
theological reasoning: arguing.  He shows, again, that arguing is not one 
single activity, rightly practiced in only one way.  Theological reasoners 
have conducted arguments in different ways; they have taken themselves to 
be doing different kinds of thing when they argue.  Adams’ chapter itself 
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argues that we should attend to the different shapes and practices of 
argument – the different logics in play – when we encounter the theological 
arguments of others, and when we engage in argument for ourselves. 
 
Karen Kilby focuses on another aspect of theological reasoning: the attempt 
to achieve clarity.  She shows that different theological reasoners have 
hoped for different kinds of clarity, and have worked towards them in 
different ways.  In order to understand the kind of clarity available in 
theological reasoning, we need to ask what it is that we are trying to be clear 
about – and that means that theological clarity, which involves clarity about 
God, might be rather different from other kinds.  Kilby nevertheless argues 
(clearly!) that theological reasoners can and should aim at clarity – even if it 
will sometimes be clarity about what we can’t understand and why.  
 
Simon Oliver explores theological reasoners’ engagement with philosophy.  
In line with earlier chapters, he shows that ‘philosophy’ is not one thing; it 
is an activity that has varied in form from context to context and generation 
to generation.  Oliver stresses the ways in which philosophy has, in different 
ways at different times, been a corporate and practical discipline – a search 
together for wise ways of living.  He then looks at various different ways in 
which theologians, who are themselves engaged in a search together for 
wise ways of living, have engaged with philosophy, and the different things 
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they have hoped for – and suggests some questions theological reasoners 
today might have in mind when they read philosophy. 
 
This section finishes with Chad Pecknold’s investigation of the relationship 
between theological reasons and the public sphere, or public reason.  His 
chapter displays some of the characteristics described above: it is not a 
general account written by nobody in particular, but a specific argument 
written by a particular theologian at an identifiable moment in history.  
Pecknold is a Catholic theologian involved in debates about his tradition’s 
place and role in the public sphere in the United States, and his chapter 
offers quite a sharp argument from that specific context.  That argument 
displays the kinds of thinking and questioning in which theological 
reasoners in other contexts, or working within other traditions, might need 
to engage. 
